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eBook The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942 ePub

eBook The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942 ePub

by H. P. Willmott

  • ISBN: 0870210920
  • Category: Military
  • Subcategory: History
  • Author: H. P. Willmott
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Naval Institute Press (October 1, 1983)
  • Pages: 596
  • ePub book: 1631 kb
  • Fb2 book: 1876 kb
  • Other: docx lit lrf lrf
  • Rating: 4.5
  • Votes: 403

Description

This book is the second volume of the trilogy on the Pacific War written by British professor H. P. Willmott, and covers Japanese and Allied Pacific strategies from February through June, 1942, specifically encompassing the great carrier actions of Coral Sea and Midway.

This book is the second volume of the trilogy on the Pacific War written by British professor H. Both the first volume of the trilogy, entitled Empires in the Balance, and The Barrier and the Javelin are remarkable for their depth of analysis

the Javelin : Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942.

The Barrier and the Javelin : Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942.

Midway was in early June 1942 so at the pace he's writing there is no way this will be a trilogy. In fact, the first book came out in 1982, this one in 1983 and there have been no further releases in this series. The book contains a few minor grammatical errors. Additionally, the events at Midway have recently b This book is not as interesting as his previous work, Empires In The Balance. Both books were to be part of a trilogy, but this book only focuses on just 2 battles; Coral Sea and Midway.

Are you sure you want to remove The barrier and the javelin from your list? . Japanese and Allied Pacific strategies, February to June 1942.

Are you sure you want to remove The barrier and the javelin from your list? The barrier and the javelin. Published 1983 by Naval Institute Press in Annapolis, Md. Written in English.

He holds a doctorate from London University and has taught military history at institutions in both Great Britain and the United States.

P. Willmott, a member of the Royal Historical Society, has written more than a dozen books on modern naval and military subjects, including the final work in his trilogy, Grave of a Dozen Schemes, and the critically acclaimed history of the Second World War, The Great Crusade. He holds a doctorate from London University and has taught military history at institutions in both Great Britain and the United States. Shipping: £ . 4 From .

Willmott, H. (1983). The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. Hackett, Bob, and Sander Kingsepp (1998–2007). HIJMS Katori: Tabular Record of Movement".

Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942. Totally balanced in presentation, the book also explains the basis of Allied miscalculations and provides explanations of the defeats that overwhelmed American, British, and Dutch forces throughout Southeast Asia in a little more than three months. Willmott argues that it was Japan’s concentration and economy of force that contributed to its success in that early campaign.

Volume 44, Issue 2. February 1985, pp. 410-411. The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. xvii, 596 pp. Maps, Source Notes, Bibliography, General Index, Index of Ships.

Examines the military policies of the Allied and Japanese forces and describes the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway

Comments

Onnell Onnell
Sequel to’ Empires in the Balance ‘author sets out to describe the sequence of events between February to June 1942 . In the period two major naval battles ( Coral Sea, Midway) of World War II were fought in the Pacific. Here one could get detailed account of those conflicts.

Author begins by sketching the background that set the stage for the epic clash between two navies. Japan was involved in a debilitating war in China. In order to free herself from western economic stranglehold the country planned to annex the resources of south east Asia. This set Tokyo in a collision course with status quo powers particularly the United States. Establishment of Japanese-led east Asia co- prosperity sphere was considered a threat to western economic interests as it knocked the bottom out American ‘open door’ policy. Americans retaliated by halting oil exports to Japan and by freezing Japanese economic assets in the United States.

I don’t what to make of author’s claim that Washington officials did not realize the implications of such a policy. Ambassador Grew’s warnings American actions far from deterring Japan would push the country on the road to war fell on deaf ears.

There is a rich fund of information on Japanese navy’s war fighting doctrines, operational concepts and strategy worked out to fight western powers. Japanese realized they were weaker to American opponent in numbers and proposed to counter quantitative inferiority with qualitative superiority. New class of imperial navy’s warships outgunned and outran their opponents. Latest development in the fields of optics, electronics and pyrotechnics were harnessed to add a lethal punch to the navy. Only in the field of radar development was Japanese lagging behind.

Another feature of Japanese strategic matrix was subordination of material to moral factors. The nation relied on human resources to offset material weakness. Japanese believed the spirit of self sacrifice and willingness to court death could counter any material disadvantage.

Traditional Japanese naval strategy envisaged US fleet sortie from Pearl Harbor with the decisive fleet action fought in western Pacific near Japanese home waters. On its way the US fleet would be attacked by submarines, aircraft based in the Japanese-held islands in the central Pacific which would whittle down American strength leading to equalization in force levels. However Pacific war opened in a different note. Attack on Pearl Harbor represented a significant shift from traditional to an unorthodox form of waging war. Admiral c-in-c Combined Fleet thought it was dangerous to have an open flank while Japanese forces were busy assaulting Malayan peninsula ,East Indies. American fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ideally placed to menace Japanese line of communications and had to be annihilated at the outset.

Author’s study of Allied strategy in the Pacific has been lengthy, exhaustive. For some time American had to dilute their commitment to defeat Germany first by diverting resources to Pacific to hold the line. British were committed to the defense of Middle East .Australia felt her security endangered by Japanese advance looked toward Americans for help.

After the initial triumph Japanese high command , according to author, failed to evolve a coherent long term plan to win the war. Navy was pulled in several directions: Australia, south west Pacific, Indian ocean. Author argues plans were handicapped by army’s refusal to co operate. Among the options that lay open I found Kuroshima’s plan to extend operations to western Indian ocean region as the most deadly. Had that been implemented successfully it could have rocked the foundations of British empire. Instead Nagumo’s carriers launched a foray into the area and then backed off.

Author has censured the Japanese for thinking they could keep the war limited. He has supplied reasons to show why this was not possible. Under the circumstances Japan was left with no option but continue with offensive operations until Anglo-American bloc was forced to negotiating table.

Three chapters have been devoted to describe the actions at Coral sea. Even more space has been allotted on Midway. Salient features have all been familiar to me. Author, however, has elaborated considerably some key aspects of the campaign. What I found striking, fleets exchanged blows without coming into contact one another heralding a new era in naval combat. Bombers were vectored toward their targets based on sighting reports provided by scout planes.

In the concluding section author has placed the American victories in proper perspective. Japanese defeat at Midway could never be deemed as decisive as battles around Solomon sea and Guadalcanal show that Imperial Navy still retained lot of its punch. What could be definitely said of those battles Americans regained strategic initiative lost after mauling US navy received at Pearl Harbor and quickly effected a transition from defensive to an offensive mode. Then began its drive to breach defense perimeter erected hoping to shield herself.

I wouldn’t recommend this book for beginners; loaded with so much information that he could easily feel overwhelmed.
Bajinn Bajinn
This book is the second volume of the trilogy on the Pacific War written by British professor H. P. Willmott, and covers Japanese and Allied Pacific strategies from February through June, 1942, specifically encompassing the great carrier actions of Coral Sea and Midway. Both the first volume of the trilogy, entitled Empires in the Balance, and The Barrier and the Javelin are remarkable for their depth of analysis. As an historical document, however, The Barrier and the Javelin is superior to Empires in the Balance for the following reason: Empires in the Balance lacks footnote references, whereas The Barrier and the Javelin is extensively footnoted, making it a much more useful tool for the historian or serious Pacific War aficionado.

Willmott opens The Barrier and the Javelin by pointing out that Japan, alone among major combatants in WWII, was fighting a war for a limited goal: that of forcing the Allies to accept as fait accompli the Empire's gains in the opening months of the war, as described in Empires in the Balance, wherein they seized the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Burma and the Philippines and bombed Pearl Harbor. In other words, they had woefully misjudged the nature of the conflict they brought upon themselves: a total war of annihilation. Japan's success in the opening phase of the war was achieved through wide dispersal of economical forces with inflexible timelines and slim margins for error logistically and operationally. The crucial error of the Japanese, Willmott demonstrates, was believing that the next phase of the war, that of defending their empire's vast perimeter, could be fought the same way as the first.

Willmott's accounts of Coral Sea and Midway are comprehensive and deeply analytical. The planning and command decisions are all carefully examined, and not even the weather patterns of the combat areas are left unexplored. Willmott cites mostly secondary sources, and well known primary sources, so the book is unremarkable in terms of utilizing previously unknown sources. What Willmott is able to do, however, is synthesize existing sources and reach his own conclusions, often ascribing great importance to episodes that earlier authors either treated lightly or ignored all together. To cite but one example, Willmott finds great significance in the incident of February 20, 1942, where the USS Lexington was attacked by Japanese bombers out of Rabaul and most of the bombers were shot down, with minimal loss to the Americans. Willmott uses this to demonstrate the fallacy of Japan's defense perimeter attrition strategy.

In the last chapter, entitled Final Perspectives, Willmott examines the historical importance of Coral Sea and Midway and whether or not, as many have claimed, Midway was the "decisive" battle of the Pacific War, and what it means generally for a battle to be considered decisive. No spoiler here: you should read the book and find out Willmott's conclusions for yourself. But a word of warning: The Barrier and the Javelin is not for the faint of heart. For those not yet familiar with Coral Sea and Midway, S. E. Morison's volume on these two battles would be a much better place to start, and then read Willmott if you want a more exhaustive analysis.
Malojurus Malojurus
This is the sequel to Empires in the Balance which covered the build up to war, the attack on Pearl Harbor and the loss of Java and the DEI. This one covers the fall of Malaya and the Philippines, Coral Sea and Midway. As with the first this is a great book!! Very lucid, easy to follow, grounded in the big picture but still lots of interesting detail. Willmott points out that both the Brits and Americans displayed almost criminally poor judgment reinforcing the Philippines and Singapore with a force they knew at the time would be inadequate to hold it and thus condemned tens of thousands of men to Japanese POW camps.

Originally Willmott set out to write a trilogy on WWII in the Pacific, but he found that he needed two volumes just to get through Midway. He would probably have needed another volume just for the Solomons and God only know how many for the rest of the war. It seems that these two books make up two thirds of a projected trilogy, but I can't seem to figure out what the third book is or if it was ever published. Anyway, great read, highly recommended!!