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eBook 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II ePub

eBook 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II ePub

by Michael Jabara Carley

  • ISBN: 1566632528
  • Category: Humanities
  • Subcategory: Other
  • Author: Michael Jabara Carley
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Ivan R. Dee; First Edition edition (May 25, 1999)
  • Pages: 384
  • ePub book: 1992 kb
  • Fb2 book: 1334 kb
  • Other: lit mbr rtf docx
  • Rating: 4.3
  • Votes: 361

Description

In 1939 they sought to make the Grand Alliance that never was between France, Britain, and the Soviet .

In 1939 they sought to make the Grand Alliance that never was between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. He challenges prevailing interpretations of the origins of World War II by situating 1939 at the end of the early cold war between the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, and by showing how anti-communism was the major cause of the failure to form an alliance against Hitler.

As Michael Jabara Carley writes in the opening pages of this volume, "This is not a pretty story. It is about appeasement and the failures of collective security in Europe against Nazi aggression. It is about moral depravity and blindness, about villains and cowards

As Michael Jabara Carley writes in the opening pages of this volume, "This is not a pretty story. It is about moral depravity and blindness, about villains and cowards. Carley offers a provocative thesis: anticommunist passions in England and France prevented these countries from forming an antifascist alliance with the Soviet Union that might have headed off the bloodiest conflict in human history.

1939: The Alliance That. Ernst Henry wrote two books on this question, Hitler over Europe? and Hitler over Russia? In the former, Henry warned of an appeasement policy towards Germany

1939: The Alliance That. Never Was. and. the Coming. Ernst Henry wrote two books on this question, Hitler over Europe? and Hitler over Russia? In the former, Henry warned of an appeasement policy towards Germany. 1 The other book contained, with nightmarish precision, a possible scenario for a fascist coalition war against the Soviet Union. Ernst Henry was the pseudonym chosen by Semën Rostovskii after fleeing from the Nazis to London, where he worked as correspondent for several newspapers. During his time in Germany he had collected a lot of material on which groups in German society supported Hitler.

Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Start by marking 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

Michael Jabara Carley. Michael Jabara Carley. Note: H-Diplo recently ran a roundtable discussion on Michael Carley's book 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II. The participants were William Keylor, Boston University; Igor Lukes, Boston University; Sally Marks, Providence, Rhode Island; and Robert Young, University of Winnipeg. Michael Jabara Carley's 1939: The Alliance that Never Was and the Coming of World War II attacks not only appeasement, and the British and French politicians associated with this policy, but also critics of the Stalinist Soviet Union in London and Paris at the time.

Any book named after that most fateful of years, 1939, is sure to tell a tragic tale.

This excellent recent work by author Michael Jabara Carley adds more fuel to the continuing fire of controversy regarding relative responsibility for the outbreak of general war in the fall of 1939.

Carley, Michael Jabara, 1945-. Dee, 1999 Includes bibliographical references (p. -308) and index. This reference provides text, photographs, charts, maps, and extensive indexes.

Michael Jabara Carley, 1939: the Alliance that Never Was and the Coming of World War II, Chicago, 1999, 77–9. 2. Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939, London, (1989), Mandarin paperback edn, 1991, 101–4. Generally, on Oster’s role in the resistance to Hitler (though not mentioning this episode), see Romedio Galeazzo Reichsgraf von Thun-Hohenstein, Der Verschw?rer. General Oster und die Milit?ropposition, Berlin, 1982. 3. Watt, How War Came, 40, 101, and see c. passim

In 1939 they sought to make the Grand Alliance that never was between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Michael Jabara Carley, a historian of relations between the West and Soviet Union, was until recently the director of the Aid to Scholarly Publications Program in Ottawa, Canada. His considerable writing in his field includes a great many historical articles and the book Revolution and Intervention. He lives in Vanier, Ontario.

By Michael Jabara Carley. Using extensive Russian and Western archives, Carley tells the sad story of the British-French relationship with the Soviet Union in 1938-39. Refuting recent revisionist views, he argues that Neville Chamberlain was an appeaser whose anticommunism exceeded his distaste for Nazism, not a realist constrained by Britain's insufficient resources and imperial commitments.

At a crucial point in the twentieth century, as Nazi Germany prepared for war, negotiations between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union became the last chance to halt Hitler’s aggression. Incredibly, the French and British governments dallied, talks failed, and in August 1939 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. Michael Carley’s gripping account of these negotiations is not a pretty story. It is about the failures of appeasement and collective security in Europe. It is about moral depravity and blindness, about villains and cowards, and about heroes who stood against the intellectual and popular tides of their time. Some died for their beliefs, others labored in obscurity and have been nearly forgotten. In 1939 they sought to make the Grand Alliance that never was between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. This story of their efforts is background to the wartime alliance created in 1941 without France but with the United States in order to defeat a demonic enemy. 1939 is based upon Mr. Carley’s longtime research on the period, including work in French, British, and newly opened Soviet archives. He challenges prevailing interpretations of the origins of World War II by situating 1939 at the end of the early cold war between the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, and by showing how anti-communism was the major cause of the failure to form an alliance against Hitler. 1939 was published on September 1, the sixtieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland and the start of the war.

Comments

Siramath Siramath
The eventuality of the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty was not at all due to being induced into a state of "paranoia" as another reviewer asserts, it was pure rationality. In fact, the book shows in exhaustive detail just how far the Soviet Government was willing to go in being patient in their pursuit of leading or letting events lead the western powers to ending their self-destructive maneuverings away from a collective security alliance that might have saved their countries and scores of millions of lives in the world altogether. No one can read this book, so excellently documented in its detailing of the moral and political failings of the political elites of Britain, France and Poland without understanding that the western mythology about an "Alliance" between the USSR and Hitlers Germany was in fact a rational final attempt by the USSR to stave off and buy time to prepare for the eventual onslaught that came. Western versions about the treaty are merely attempts to cover up how the west caused their own destruction that only the Soviet Union eventually prevented from being total permanent and total. Carley detracts from the value of his narrative by engaging in outdated coldwar orthodoxies about what he calls the "Stalinist purges". The book was published in 1999, so uncritically repeating that vague term was incongruous to the critical examination he applies to the myth of a Hitler-Stalin "alliance". Others have demolished the cold war orthodoxies that there were "blood purges BY Stalin. There were in fact conspiracies with Germany intelligence by rogue wreckers to eliminate party members to spread terror and provoke an uprising against the Soviet Govt that failed and the perps were caught, confessed and were sentenced to death.
Roru Roru
This excellent recent work by author Michael Jabara Carley adds more fuel to the continuing fire of controversy regarding relative responsibility for the outbreak of general war in the fall of 1939. Indeed, in this well-written and well-documented work, the author's main argument contends that it was the collective failure of the so-called allies to overcome their own fears about communism and the perceived threats associated with the rise of international socialism that were responsible for the failure to bring the Soviet Union into the Allied orbit in time to stave off Hitler's rush into Poland. Given the well-documented facts and figures marshaled in defense of this argument, it is difficult to fault this view.
For example, Carley illustrates how the Soviet Union made attempt after attempt to solicit the support and agreement of the western allies to form an alliance against Germany, only to be slow-rolled and virtually ignored time after time. In this fashion, the Soviets were finally left with few obvious options other than to turn into the direction fo their greatest fear and accept terms with the Nazis, hoping that by cooperating them and acting as their key supplier in the face of growing intransigence on the part of the Allies, the Germans would leave them alone. The author masterfully shows how this consistent series of rebuffs of the Russians by the western Allies was related to a western phobia of the communism and its associated threats, and illustrates how these fears of all things socialistic blinded the Allies to the obvious dangers presented by the acts of the Nazi regime.
Thus, despite the fact that the Russians regularly tested the waters for a broad alliance against the Nazis during the late thirties, it was the western Allies who spurned such efforts to create a united front that did so much to engender the conditions allowing it to break out in the fall of 1939. In fact, as the author so well illustrates, a particularly virulent form of anti-socialist fervor seemed to affect both the British ruling class as well as many in the higher reaches within the French political community during this period of time, and this attitude did much to limit the discussion of the possibilities for compromise and joint action with the Russians. Of course, there were a few hardy souls with the vision and perspective to understand how important an early alliance with the Soviet Union, including Winston Churchill in Britain and Robert Vansittart in France. But few others listened to their emotional pleas for action and union with the Russians or their reasoning for taking such common cause with the dreaded socialists.
This is a carefully documented and painstakingly well-researched work that serves a much wider readership and appreciation for it as the work of careful scholarship that it is. I was especially impressed by the degree of information revealed from the archives of the former Soviet Union, which acts to shed a lot of light on the efforts made by Stalin and the Soviet cabinet during the time in question. This is an excellent book, and a worthy companion to a number of other excellent works such as "Grand Illusion" and "Dark Valley", each of which explores the nature of international politics in the years leading up to the outbreak of World War Two. Enjoy!
Ochach Ochach
Carley recounts the diplomatic story of 1939, the nadir of a "low, dishonest decade." Its characters are "Guilty Men" and "Gravediggers," whose "clever hopes" consisted mainly of appeasing Hitler. He reveals the failed negotiations to forge an alliance that "never was" with Russia which might have prevented war; the fear and short-sightedness that doomed that alliance; the ideological blindness that feared a victory that could lead to the spread of Communism more than a defeat that would spread Nazi terror. The book is a corrective to those who have blamed Russia and the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact for the outbreak of the war, ignoring the 5 years of efforts by the Soviets to form an effective anti-German alliance.
There are few heroes in this story. France, divided internally, found it easiest to follow the British. France wouldn't move to save Eastern Europe without Britain, and Britain wouldn't move. What the Russians wanted was an ironclad military alliance, with precise and concrete terms, staff talks and passage rights through Poland so that Russia could come to grips with Germany. Poland could not hold the eastern front against Germany alone. Without such an agreement Russia's options were to stay neutral or come to terms with Germany. One Foreign Office official in May 1939 summed it up, "The Russians have for years past been pressing for staff [talks]...and the French at our instigation have always refused them." Gen. Gamelin as early as 1936 told the French Staff that the only real help against Germany had to come from Russia and Russia needed passage rights to come to France's aid.
If the British and French were suspicious of Russian motives, the Russians were equally suspicious. They felt that the Allies would be happy to see Germany and Russia destroy each other. Chamberlain wrote that he was so "skeptical of the value of Russian help that [the Allies' position] was [not] greatly worsened if we had to do without them." (France estimated Britain had two divisions to send to its aid, Russia 100 divisions.) The British wouldn't fight to save the Baltics, but wanted Russia to fight to save Belgium.
Despite their awareness of this fundamental problem, the Allies couldn't see their way to a solution even after five years. Litvinov, the chief proponent of collective security, was finally replaced by Molotov as Russian frustrations grew and war neared. The British considered Molotov "totally ignorant," "an ignorant and suspicious peasant" with a peasant's "foolish cunning." In July 1939 Chamberlain was still arguing that the Allies did not need the offensive might to defeat Germany, only defensive forces to prevent a German victory.
When the Allies made a last ditch effort to string the Russians along it sent a delegation on a slow merchant vessel with instructions so vague as to be "almost useless," lacking written credentials and told to avoid discussions of passage rights. No wonder the Russians were suspicious. In the end the Russians signed a non-aggression pact with Germany; Poland, "an aggressor in 1938 and a victim in 1939," was partitioned. Even then, a month into the war, Chamberlain was still suggesting that Britain might have to unite with Germany "against the common danger."
Carley blames chiefly the British and interwar anti-communism for the failure of the Western Powers to form an alliance with Russia that might have prevented WWII. Using extensive research in French and British archives, Carley focuses narrowly on the diplomatic "dance" going on among the British, French and Soviets, other broader issues are only touched upon as they affect this diplomatic activity. The politics and diplomacy of the smaller Eastern European states is largely ignored as Carley concentrates on the "big picture."
The narrative bogs down in the middle as the British and the French repeatedly try to wiggle out of making any firm commitments to Russia. British and French obstinate un-Realpolitik grows tedious, but demonstrates the growing frustrations of the Russians. A frustration that had already driven the Italians onto the side of Hitler. Exceptionally well-researched, "1939" presents an important interpretation of the events leading to WWII.