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eBook Perception, Causation, and Objectivity (Consciousness  Self-Consciousness Series) ePub

eBook Perception, Causation, and Objectivity (Consciousness Self-Consciousness Series) ePub

by Johannes Roessler,Hemdat Lerman,Naomi Eilan

  • ISBN: 0199692041
  • Category: Humanities
  • Subcategory: Other
  • Author: Johannes Roessler,Hemdat Lerman,Naomi Eilan
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press; 1 edition (September 2, 2011)
  • Pages: 360
  • ePub book: 1599 kb
  • Fb2 book: 1834 kb
  • Other: rtf lrf lrf lit
  • Rating: 4.6
  • Votes: 137

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ISBN-13: 978-0199692057. Johannes Roessler is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. Start reading Perception, Causation, and Objectivity on your Kindle in under a minute. Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.

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Consciousness & Self-Consciousness Series. 19 brand-new essays, specially written by a leading team of experts. Interrogates fundamental assumptions about how we experience the world.

Causation is a concept that plays an essential role in reasoning with commonsense. Therefore, it should follow that causation should also play an essential role in the theories of action and change. It is a property inherent to the dynamics of changing environments. However, in this article we postulate that causation is a form of abstraction. As a consequence of this view, one should not attempt. to model causation as a primitive relationship between entities.

Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience and its relation to perceived objects, or any particular view of the way perception yields knowledge? Second, what explains the apparent intuitive appeal of commonsense realism?

Perception, Causation, and Objectivity Roessler, Johannes; Lerman, Hemdat; Eilan, Naomi Oxford Academ 9780199692040 : To be a commonsense realist is to hold that perceptual experience is (in . Should we think of commonsense realism as a view held by some philosophers, or is there a sense in which we are pre-theoretically committed to commonsense realism in virtue of the experi Дополнительное описание: 1 Johannes Roessler: Introduction; 2 Quassim Cassam: Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle; 3 John Campbell: Relational vs Kantian Responses to Berkeley's Puzzle; 4 Naomi Eilan: Experiential Objectivity; 5.

Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, Naomi Eilan. To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness, objectivity, and causal understanding. 9 Mb. Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Consciousness and Self-Consciousness). Johannes Roessler, Naomi Eilan. 6. 7 Mb. 8 Mb. Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology

To be a "commonsense realist" is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness, objectivity, and causal understanding. This volume collects nineteen original essays by leading philosophers and psychologists on these topics. Questions addressed include: What are the commitments of commonsense realism? Does it entail any particular view of the nature of perceptual experience, or any particular view of the epistemology of perceptual knowledge? Should we think of commonsense realism as a view held by some philosophers, or is there a sense in which we are pre-theoretically committed to commonsense realism in virtue of the experience we enjoy or the concepts we use or the explanations we give? Is commonsense realism defensible, and if so how, in the face of the formidable criticism it faces? Specific issues addressed in the philosophical essays include the status of causal requirements on perception, the causal role of perceptual experience, and the relation between objective perception and causal thinking. The scientific essays present a range of perspectives on the development, phylogenetic and ontogenetic, of the human adult conception of perception.