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eBook Verification Of Conventional Arms Control In Europe: Technological Constraints And Opportunities ePub

eBook Verification Of Conventional Arms Control In Europe: Technological Constraints And Opportunities ePub

by Richard Kokoski

  • ISBN: 0813310547
  • Category: Social Sciences
  • Subcategory: Other
  • Author: Richard Kokoski
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition (August 30, 1990)
  • Pages: 322
  • ePub book: 1262 kb
  • Fb2 book: 1572 kb
  • Other: rtf lrf doc azw
  • Rating: 4.6
  • Votes: 423

Description

Verification technology and methods. 2. National technical means Richard Kokoski. 3. Commercial and third-party satellites Johnny Skorve. 4. Aerial observation and overflights Hartwik Spitzer. 5. Short-distance sensors Jürgen Altmann. 6. Tags Steve Fetter and Thomas Garwin.

Verification technology and methods. 7. Monitoring production of conventional weapons Ivan Oelrich. 8. The Envelope Scheme Klaus Jacob. 9. Implementation of verification methods Patricia M. Lewis.

Author: Kokoski, Richard, 1952-.

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3 /00427 Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe : Technological Constraints and Opportunities - Stockholm : SIPRI. This book provides an in-depth examination of the full range of methods for the verification of a conventional arms control regime in Europe.

The original Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was negotiated and concluded during the last years of the Cold War and established comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment in Europe (from the Atlantic.

The original Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was negotiated and concluded during the last years of the Cold War and established comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) and mandated the destruction of excess weaponry. The treaty proposed equal limits for the two "groups of states-parties", the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact

Conventional Arms Control provides an analysis of the political and operational problems of verification .

Conventional Arms Control provides an analysis of the political and operational problems of verification of conventional arms control in Europe. It examines aspects of the verification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and includes assessments of the different negotiating positions and concepts involved.

Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, Technological Constraints and Opportunities (1990), 251–261. 42 T. Stock and J. Matousek, in R. Kokoski and S. Koulik (ed. op. ci. 264 – 272. 43 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, adopted in Basel on 22 March 1989. 44 1980 Canberra Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). 45 Article 218 of the Law of the Sea Convention.

Achieving a modernized conventional arms control arrangement in Europe requires new thinking and a new approach to. .

Achieving a modernized conventional arms control arrangement in Europe requires new thinking and a new approach to addressing regional security. The task is not easy and it will likely take time, but initiating the process cannot wait if it is to contribute to long-standing American efforts towards strengthening European security. The principal aim for the new arrangement would be however to focus on the technical elements of conventional arms control in Europe – the very elements that ensured the success of CFE (equipment reductions, data exchange, inspections) and recast the political elements of CFE (its geography, block-to-block and balancing approach).

By far the most significant structural arms control agreement was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990, covering the member states of NATO . Technological Constraints and Opportunities.

By far the most significant structural arms control agreement was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990, covering the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Falkenrath 1994; Sharp 2006). Its preamble formulated its objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than previously, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and of eliminating (as a matter of high priority) the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe.

Ambassador Richard Burt, Former . Diplomat and Negotiator on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and . Ambassador Anatoly I. Antonov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States. Joan Rohlfing, President and COO, Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The first of a projected two-volume study, this book provides an in-depth examination of the full range of methods for the verification of a conventional arms control regime in Europe. Offering contributions by specialists from both the East and West, it explores the technological aspects of verification as they relate to the proposals currently under consideration at the CFE talks in Vienna. Although it evaluates relevant technology, this book is primarily focused on the dynamics of successfully monitoring a European arms control agreement. Significant experience has been gained from other arms control regimes, most notably the INF agreement, which established a precedent for extensive on-site inspections. The contributors seek to identify the optimal mix of monitoring methods most applicable to the important items on the CFE agenda. The multilateral nature of the CFE negotiations presents the organizational challenges for the co-ordination of sharing information and technology to overcome the large dicrepancies in verification technology expertise. The text points toward a specific and attainable verification regime that could be incorporated into the present arms control negotiations.