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eBook Political Competition: Theory and Applications ePub

eBook Political Competition: Theory and Applications ePub

by John E. Roemer

  • ISBN: 0674004884
  • Category: Social Sciences
  • Subcategory: Other
  • Author: John E. Roemer
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Harvard University Press (May 16, 2001)
  • Pages: 352
  • ePub book: 1728 kb
  • Fb2 book: 1264 kb
  • Other: lrf mbr lit rtf
  • Rating: 4.5
  • Votes: 267

Description

The Roemer model of political competition is a game between political parties in which each party announces a multidimensional policy vector

The Roemer model of political competition is a game between political parties in which each party announces a multidimensional policy vector. Since Nash equilibria do not normally exist when the policy space is multidimensional, John Roemer introduced the concept of party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE), which can be considered a generalization of the concept of Nash equilibrium in models of political competition. It is also a generalization of the Wittman model of political competition.

In this book, John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties. He models the theory under many specifications. Roemer characterizes―correctly―the traditional Downsian model of political competition as one modeling competition between ‘opportunistic politicians’ who themselves have no policy preferences and who choose instead to adopt positions that appeal to the preferences of the optimum number of voters. This, he says, is a misguided model, easy to use but empirically and theoretically inaccurate and producing meaningless results.

Theory and Applications. 2. Table of Contents. of its simplicity is the elimination of politics from political competition. In this book, I attempt to develop, in a systematic and rigorous fashion, the theory of. competition between political parties in a democracy

Theory and Applications. competition between political parties in a democracy. Although the Downs model is not. the one of choice, I develop the Downs theory as well, for it has played an important role in. the formal political theory. It is, moreover, important to understand when the theory of. competition between parties produces political equilibria that differ from the Downs.

Political Competition book. Start by marking Political Competition: Theory and Applications as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. He models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional. He examines all eight possible combinations of these choice assumptions, and characterizes their equilibria. He fleshes out a model in which each party is composed of three different factions concerned with winning, with policy, and with publicity

John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or unce.

John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional.

Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidate motivation, uncertainty, and convergence. American Journal of Political Science 29: 69–95. Hinich, M. and Munger, M. (1994). Ideology and the theory of political choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Elizabeth and Varick Stout Professor of Political Science and Economics,Yale University. Political competition: Theory and applications. distributive justice equality of opportunity socialism climate change cooperation. JE Roemer, JE Roemer. Harvard University Press, 2009.

In this book, John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties. He models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional. He examines all eight possible combinations of these choice assumptions, and characterizes their equilibria.

He fleshes out a model in which each party is composed of three different factions concerned with winning, with policy, and with publicity. Parties compete with one another. When internal bargaining is combined with external competition, a natural equilibrium emerges, which Roemer calls party-unanimity Nash equilibrium.

Assuming only the distribution of voter preferences and the endowments of the population, he deduces the nature of the parties that will form. He then applies the theory to several empirical puzzles, including income distribution, patterns of electoral success, and why there is no labor party in the United States.

Comments

Mardin Mardin
This is an important book and the seminal contribution to political competition since Anthony Downs' "An Economic Theory of Democracy". In a sense, this book is both a response and (constructive) critique of the incredible assumptions the Downsian framework requires. Unfortunately, the vast majority of political science scholarship is still motivated by the Downsian model of political competition. This book offers a comprehensive introduction to many superior models of political competition that give the reader important insights that more closely approximate empirical reality. That said, the book is quite technical and the more complicated models generate multiple equilibria. The Downsian model, for all its flaws, is very elegant and generates a simple equilbrium outcome: median voter politics. I suspect this complexity partly explains why many are reluctant to abandon the Downsian paradigm.
Deeroman Deeroman
I believe the contents of this book are important reading for anyone attempting to apply game theoretic analysis to political policy making. However I think the book would be more influential with a broader audience if it were easier to read. The author should first discuss what he is about to prove in English before launching into mathematical proofs. As it is, reading the proofs is pretty much unavoidable in order to get to the next point as the organization of the writing is not clear enough to find the next point. While mathematical descriptions are important, I find that those discussions are more understood if the are given in an organized manner. For example.. "I will next show that <a point in English>, here is the theorem.. to see the proof go to <end of chapter or someplace>" If it is important to spell out the proof before moving onto the next topic, then the topics should at least be clearly identifiable (allowing the reader to skim the proof).

Another issue.. it would be nice if all the notation was defined at least briefly in a table somewhere perhaps with a pointer to the first reference to it. As it is if you forget what a symbol means you have to skim back through the book to find the first definition of it.